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Beck's (1967; 1976) cognitive theory of depression states that depressed 
individuals have cognitive biases which lead them to view themselves and their 
experiences negatively. In contrast, healthy, nondepressed individuals are thought to 
avoid such biases and have a relatively accurate picture of the world. The emergence 
of "depressive realism" (Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Golin, Terrell, & Johnson, 1977; 
Mischel, 1979), however, provided evidence which contradicts Beck's cognitive 
theory of depression. 
Depressive Realism 
In their well-known depressive realism studies, Alloy and Abramson (1979) 
demonstrated that depressed individuals tend to have a realistic perception of 
contingencies in a laboratory. Alloy and Abramson (1979) conducted several 
judgment of contingency studies in which depressed and nondepressed individuals 
were asked to rate their perceived degree of control over a light turning on and off. 
In the series of trials, subjects responded by either pushing or not pushing a button, 
and then noted whether the light came on. In several studies the actual degree of 
contingency was manipulated, as was the payoff for light onset. Overall, depressed 
subjects were more accurate in judging their control than were nondepressed subjects. 
Furthermore, nondepressed subjects tended to overestimate their control when they 
won desirable outcomes that were in fact not contingent on their responses, and they 
underestimated their degree of control when they lost desirable outcomes that were 
dependent on their responses. In this research, depressed subjects were "sadder but 
wiser" in that their judgments of control were more accurate and unbiased than 
nondepressives' judgments. This research also demonstrated that while depressed 
individuals tended not to have cognitive biases regarding control over laboratory 
contingencies, normal or nondepressed individuals did. Nondepressed individuals 
gave higher judgment of control ratings when having control was desirable and lower 
control ratings when having control was undesirable. 
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Depressive realism has been demonstrated with other types of tasks. A 
number of prediction studies have shown that depressed subjects give more realistic 
and accurate predictions than nondepressed subjects. For example, Golin, Terrell, 
and Johnson (1977) showed that depressed subjects gave accurate confidence ratings 
for rolling certain dice outcomes. In contrast, nondepressives tended to be optimistic 
and made significantly higher ratings of confidence than depressives. Interestingly, 
these findings reversed when the experimenter rolled the dice. That is, nondepressed 
subjects were more accurate when predicting the experimenter's success whereas 
depressed subjects demonstrated an optimistic bias when predicting the experimenter's 
success. Thus, Golin et al. 's (1977) findings suggest that depressives are realistic 
when making predictions for themselves but demonstrate an optimistic bias in their 
predictions for others. This optimistic bias (seeing desirable events as more likely 
than objectively true) is one type of wishful thinking. Interestingly, Golin et al. 's 
(1977) findings suggest that depressives engage in wishful thinking for other people 
but when it comes to themselves, they are realistic. On the other hand, 
nondepressives appeared to be "wishful thinkers" for themselves but not for others. 
Coping Research 
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Research has also been conducted to determine whether depressives use 
different coping styles than nondepressives in response to negative life events. One of 
the scales that measures different coping styles is the revised Ways of Coping 
Checklist (WCCL; Vitaliano, Russo, Carr, Maiuro, & Becker, 1985). Research using 
this scale has yielded significant correlations between depression and the wishful 
thinking coping style. That is, as level of depression increased, subjects were more 
likely to endorse more wishful thinking items relative to the remaining subscales. In 
the coping literature, the wishful thinking coping style has been defined as a tendency 
to endorse items that have a "wishful" component (e.g., "Hoped a miracle would 
happen"). 
Vitaliano, Maiuro, Russo, and Becker (1987) used a revision of the WCCL 
(Vitaliano et al., 1985) to examine the coping styles of individuals suffering from 
various forms of psychopathology (e.g., panic disorders, phobic disorders, etc.). 
Interestingly, those who indicated depression (in addition to the primary disorder) 
were more likely to engage in a wishful thinking coping style. Furthermore, 
Vitaliano et al. (1985) cited 12 stress and coping studies with more than 2000 subjects 
in which a positive relationship between wishful thinking and psychological distress 
was consistently demonstrated. That is, greater use of wishful thinking as a coping 
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style was related to higher levels of symptomology and, more specifically, depression. 
Due to the correlational nature of this research, there was no discussion about the 
causal factors involved. 
Vitaliano et al. (1985) stated that their wishful thinking (coping) findings 
reinforce the notions of depression proposed by Coyne, Aldwin, and Lazarus (1981). 
Specifically, Coyne et al. ( 1981) also found that depression was positively correlated 
with wishful thinking. According to Coyne et al. (1981), by checking wishful 
thinking items on the WCCL, such as "Wished I was a stronger person - more 
optimistic and forceful," depressives focus on negative aspects of specific stressful 
episodes. That is, wishful statements imply that one's current state or outcomes are 
in some way inadequate. Their study suggests that this negative self-preoccupation 
and accentuation of the negative, which are correlated with wishful thinking, may lead 
to reduced effectiveness in coping with everyday stressors (Coyne et al., 1981). 
Differences between Depressive Realism and Copin~ Literatures 
It is important to make a distinction between the definition of wishful thinking 
in the coping literature and the definition from the experimental literature (such as 
Alloy and Abramson's (1979) depressive realism studies). Experimental research has 
defined wishful thinking as the tendency to rate the likelihood of positive, desirable 
events as higher than the actual base rate of occurrence, and the tendency to rate the 
likelihood of negative, undesirable events as lower than the actual base rate (Cronbach 
& Davis, 1944; Marks, 1951). In contrast to this task-oriented measure of wishful 
thinking, the coping literature measures wishful thinking with a self-report method in 
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which subjects are asked whether they agree or disagree with wishful statements. 
For the purposes of this study, the findings of the depressive realism work 
were seen as similar to the earlier experimental wishful thinking research. That is, 
with respect to wishful thinking, it was assumed that high judgments of control for 
positive events are similar in meanin~ to giving high likelihood ratings for positive 
events. Given this view, nondepressives exhibited wishful thinking in the original 
depressive realism work since they rated their judgments of control as higher than was 
objectively true. Depressives, on the other hand, were more accurate in their 
judgments of control (although still slightly optimistic). 
Vitaliano et al. 's (1987) findings seem to contradict the notions of depressive 
realism proposed by Alloy and Abramson (1979). On the one hand, Vitaliano et al. 
(1987) demonstrated that depressives used the wishful thinking coping style. On the 
other hand, depressives tended to be more realistic than nondepressives when making 
judgments of control (Alloy & Abramson, 1979) and when predicting their probability 
of rolling winning numbers with dice (Golin et al., 1977). 
The Separation Hypothesis 
In an attempt to explain this contradiction between depressive realism and 
depressives' use of wishful thinking, a separation hypothesis was proposed. 
Specifically, the hypothesis was that depressives "separate" their desires from their 
beliefs. The notion of "desire" refers to the desirability of an event, whereas "belief" 
refers to the actual likelihood of an event occurring. It was hypothesized that in 
making judgments or predictions, depressives may rely on their beliefs and they may 
not allow their desires (e.g., wanting to have control, wanting to roll winning dice 
combinations) to influence their likelihood ratings. Thus, the current study examined 
depressed and nondepressed subjects' ratings of desirability and likelihood for 
different positive and negative events. 
Rationale for the Separation Hypothesis 
This hypothesis results from noting a difference in the methodologies between 
the depressive realism work and Vitaliano et al. 's (1985, 1987) coping research. 
Alloy and Abramson (1979) used positive and negative outcome manipulations to 
observe subsequent effects on judgments of control. In the experimental wishful 
thinking literature, the outcome manipulations, in effect, manipulated desirability 
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(i.e., if an outcome is "winning," it is more desirable). Nondepressed subjects' 
beliefs (i.e., degree of control ratings) were influenced by the desirability (winning or 
losing) of the outcome. That is, they judged themselves as having more control when 
the outcome was positive (winning something desirable) and less control when the 
outcome was negative (losing something desirable) despite the objective contingencies. 
This represents the experimental definition of wishful thinking. 
The separation hypothesis suggests that depressed subjects do not integrate 
their desires with their beliefs in making judgments of control. Rather, their desires 
are "separated" from their beliefs with the result that depressives rated their true 
beliefs with little influence of their desires. As a result, depressives gave more 
accurate estimates of control in Alloy and Abramson's study (1979). 
The separation hypothesis may also explain why depressive symptomology 
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correlated with wishful thinking in the coping literature. Vitaliano et al. 's (1985, 
1987) studies used the revised WCCL (1985) to measure wishful thinking. This was 
different from Alloy and Abramson's research (1979) because the WCCL presents 
items that have a desire component incorporated into them (e.g., "I wish that I could 
change what had happened"). The presentation of a desire statement, in essence, 
encouraged depressives to engage (not separate) their desires in making the ratings on 
the WCCL. As a result, one methodology found no wishful thinking, whereas the 
other found wishful thinking. Nondepressives, who presumably have a more 
favorable life view than depressives, may have had less of a need to cope with the 
stressful situation by "wishing" for something else to have happened. 
Alternative Explanations for the Contradiction between the Experimental and the 
Coping Literature 
There may be other hypotheses besides the separation hypothesis that could 
explain the contradiction in findings between the experimental and the coping 
literature regarding wishful thinking. For example, the contradiction may be 
explained by the learned helplessness hypothesis (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 
1978; Alloy & Seligman, 1979; Seligman, 1975). Specifically, the associative deficit 
hypothesis of learned helplessness suggests that depressives are more likely to fail to 
perceive the relation between their responses and the outcomes when they actually do 
have control. This would suggest that in the experimental literature on wishful 
thinking, depressives appeared to be realistic because they may have failed to perceive 
the association between their responses and the outcomes. However, Alloy and 
Abramson (1979) demonstrated that depressed subjects did not exhibit the associative 
deficit, because depressives were more accurate than nondepressives in perceiving 
their response-outcome contingencies even when, in fact, they did have control. 
Additionally, it seems that any effect of an associative deficit would have been 
minimized because the depressed subjects that were used in the study were depressed 
college students and not clinically depressed individuals. 
Another possible explanation for the contradiction pertains to the types of 
questions used by Alloy and Abramson (1979) and Golin et al. (1977). These 
questions required subjects to make judgments of control and probability ratings, 
respectively. In Alloy and Abramson's (1979) study, the subjects were told that if 
they learned the contingency, they would have a chance to win some money later. 
Golin et al. (1977) had subjects rate their confidence of receiving a winning die roll. 
It may be that in both of these cases, depressed-nondepressed differences were found 
for likelihood ratings because depressed subjects had less of a desire to win. Because 
their desire to win may have been less, depressives may have had less motivation to 
be biased and were more accurate in their judgments. This hypothesis was tested in 
this study by having subjects make desirability ratings for positive and negative 
events. Lower desirability ratings by depressed subjects would suggest that this 
hypothesis is an alternative to the separation hypothesis. 
The Present Study 
This study attempted to extend the coping literature by replicating the previous 
methodology, but also by looking at desire and likelihood ratings of various events 
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(within the same sample of subjects) to determine whether group differences exist. 
Subjects were classified as depressed or nondepressed according to Beck Depression 
Inventory scores (Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961). The 
procedures used in the coping literature were replicated by having subjects complete 
the revised WCCL (Vitaliano et al., 1985) and the Children's Coping Strategies Scale 
(CCSS; Jose, 1992). The experimental procedure was replicated by having subjects 
make desirability and likelihood ratings for various events. Additionally, subjects 
were given the Life Optimism Test (Scheier & Carver, 1985) to test the degree to 
which wishful thinking correlates with optimism. Because optimism is seen as an 
aspect of coping, this measure should assist in understanding wishful thinking in terms 
of coping. 
To test the separation hypothesis, the events were presented to subjects on a 
computer terminal where they entered their desirability and likelihood ratings. 
Desirability and likelihood ratings were conceptualized as the key factors in 
examining the separation hypothesis because it was predicted that depressives and 
nondepressives would have different relationships between their desirability and their 
likelihood ratings. Specifically, depressives were expected to engage in more 
separation than nondepressives, as indicated by the lack of a relationship between 
desire and likelihood ratings. Both positive and negative items were included in order 
to replicate Alloy and Abramson's (1979) and Golin et al. 's (1977) studies, both of 
which included positive and negative outcomes. Dice roll situations and life events 
were presented to subjects because dice roll scenarios have an objective probability 
(e.g., the probability of rolling a 3, 6, 7 or 8 with two dice is 50 % ) , whereas life 
events were potentially more personally relevant than the dice items (e.g., "What is 
the likelihood that you will get a job with a starting salary of $27,000 or greater?"). 
Dice roll scenarios also provided a probability judgment task similar to other 
depressive realism work (e.g., Golin et al., 1977). 
During a baseline condition, subjects made their ratings for half of the dice 
and half of the life events. Following this baseline period, subjects made ratings in 
one of three reward conditions (between-subjects): wishful thinking, negativistic 
thinking, and random rewards. 
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The depression literature has used the term "negativistic" to refer to cognitive 
patterns that have often been associated with depression (Riskind & Roles, 1984). In 
this literature, these patterns have been found in responses to tests of irrational 
negative beliefs, attributions, and expectations for positive and negative outcomes 
(Lewinsohn, Steinmetz, Larson, & Franklin, 1981; Riskind & Roles, 1984). In this 
study, the term "negativistic" was used in reference to a particular cognitive style 
regarding expectations of positive and negative outcomes. Specifically, negativistic 
thinking was defined as the opposite of wishful thinking and it was said to occur 
whenever subjects rated a highly desirable event as very unlikely or a highly 
undesirable event as very likely. Because depressives were predicted to "separate" 
their desires from their beliefs, it was expected that depressives' rating style 
percentages would not differ significantly from chance (based on the various 
combinations of desire and likelihood ratings, chance percentages are 27% wishful 
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ratings, 27% negativistic ratings, and 46% unclassified ratings), whereas 
nondepressives were expected to generate higher wishful rating percentages and lower 
negativistic rating percentages than would be expected by chance alone. 
Baseline 
It was predicted that depressed and nondepressed subjects would differ in the 
degree of wishful and negativistic thinking that they exhibit during baseline. 
Ruehlman, West, and Pasahow's (1985) review of the evaluative tendencies of 
depressives indicated that nondepressives were more likely to exhibit "positivistic 
evaluative responses" while depressives tended to exhibit unbiased responses which 
were neither "positivistic" or "negativistic." To the extent that positivistic evaluations 
reflect wishful thinking and negativistic evaluations reflect negativistic thinking, 
Ruehlman et al. 's (1985) review supports the separation hypothesis. 
The Three Reward Contingencies 
The reward manipulation consisted of a "points counter" on the computer 
which increased randomly or whenever subjects made the appropriate rating (i.e., 
either wishful or negativistic). This reward manipulation was included to see whether 
depressed and nondepressed subjects could determine the rating style (i.e., wishful, 
negativistic, or random) that was being rewarded. That is, it was not only important 
to determine whether different rating styles existed between groups (baseline), but 
also whether those rating styles could be influenced by a manipulation (reward). 
The attempted manipulation of subjects' rating styles was also important 
because, as Rosenfarb, Burker, Morris, and Cush (1993) indicated, there were no 
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previous studies that compared the ability of depressed and nondepressed individuals 
to adapt their behavior to new learning contingencies. To examine depressed and 
nondepressed subjects' ability to learn new contingencies, Rosenfarb et al. (1993)" 
assigned subjects to two groups. Both groups were instructed that their goal was to 
gain points by moving a circle on a grid. They were also told that moving the circle 
involved pushing buttons and observing the lights. The contingency-shaped subjects 
were not given further instructions and their behavior was assumed to have been 
shaped by the contingencies. The rule-governed subjects were given the actual rules 
for the first condition of the trials. During the second condition, the contingencies 
changed. To test acquisition and adaptation to the new contingency, a sensitivity 
score was calculated for the subjects. 
Rosenfarb et al. (1993) concluded that depressives were more sensitive to 
contingency changes than nondepressives. They also suggested that their findings 
supported the nondepressives' optimistic self-enhancing bias because the rule-governed 
nondepressives were seen as having self-presentational motives (i.e., they continued 
using the experimenter's inaccurate rules). At first, it seems that Rosenfarb et al. 's 
(1993) study supports depressive realism. That is, the depressed subjects were judged 
to have made accurate responses to the contingencies while the rule-governed 
nondepressives did not. However, in their study there were no depressed-
nondepressed contingency learning differences for the contingency-shaped subjects. 
Depressed subjects (divided into those who had and those who had not been told the 
rules) did not differ from nondepressed subjects who had not been told the rules. 
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Furthermore, the most important finding that is relevant to the current study was that 
during the initial learning period, there were no depressed-nondepressed differences in 
learning the contingencies. The only group differences occurred after subjects had 
learned the contingencies and the contingencies were changed. Rosenfarb et al. 's 
(1993) findings suggest that in the present study there should be no differences 
between depressives' and nondepressives' ability to learn wishful and negativistic 
thinking contingencies. 
Similar to Rosenfarb et al. (1993), Neunaber (1987) investigated both 
behaviors and judgments of depressed and nondepressed subjects and found that there 
were no depressed-nondepressed differences in responding to different response-
outcome contingencies. In combining the findings of both of these studies with the 
proposed separation hypothesis, it was hypothesized that, in the present study, both 
depressed and nondepressed subjects would not differ in their response to wishful and 
negativistic reward contingencies. That is, it was predicted that both groups would 
alter their response style such that they would make more wishful thinking responses 
when rewarded for wishful thinking and more negativistic thinking responses when 
rewarded for negativistic thinking (with no between-groups differences expected). 
Thus, while depressives may naturally separate their desires from their beliefs, when 
placed into a reward contingency situation they may be able to engage in any type of 
rating style depending on the reward contingency. To test the hypothesis that 
depressed and nondepressed subjects would both be able to learn wishful and 
negativistic contingencies, subjects were placed into one of three reward contingencies 
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(see Table 1). 
Reward Contingency 1. In this condition, subjects were rewarded for 
engaging in wishful thinking. Using the experimental definition of wishful thinking, 
wishful thinking was said to occur when subjects gave similar desire and likelihood 
ratings for a positive (or negative) event. For example, wishful thinking was 
demonstrated when subjects rated an event as highly desirable and highly likely, 
moderately desirable and moderately likely, or highly undesirable and highly unlikely. 
It was expected that both depressives and nondepressives would respond to this 
contingency condition by increasing their wishful thinking responses during the 
reward portion. 
Reward Contingency 2. The second contingency condition gave rewards for 
ratings reflecting negativistic thinking. Such ratings occurred when subjects' desires 
had a negative relation to their likelihood ratings, for example, when a subject rated 
an event as highly desirable and highly unlikely or, conversely, highly undesirable 
and highly likely. As with the reward for wishful thinking, subjects were also given 
rewards when both their desirability and their likelihood rating fell in the middle of 
both scales. As suggested by Rosenfarb et al's (1993) and Neunaber's (1987) work, 
it was expected that there would be no depressed-nondepressed differences in subjects' 
abilities to adopt a negativistic thinking style. 
Reward Contingency 3. The third contingency condition gave random rewards 
while subjects made the desire and likelihood ratings. Thus, sometimes a wishful 
response was rewarded, sometimes a negativistic response was rewarded, and 
Table 1 
Scoring Rules for Reward Contingency Condition 
Wishful Thinking (Reward Contingency 1) 
Subject gives: 
Desire Rating < 3 and Likelihood Rating < 4, 
Desire Rating > 3 and Likelihood Rating > 6, or 
Desire Rating = 3 and Likelihood Rating < 7 and > 3. 
Negativistic Thinking (Reward Contingency 2) 
Subject gives: 
Desire Rating < 3 and Likelihood Rating > 6, 
Desire Rating > 3 and Likelihood Rating < 4, or 
Desire Rating = 3 and Likelihood Rating < 7 and > 3. 
Note. Desire Ratings were made on a 5 point scale: 1 "Very Undesirable", 3 
"Neutral", and 5 "Very Desirable." Likelihood Ratings were made on a 9-point 
scale: 1 "Not at All Likely", 5 "50/50 Chance", and 9 "Extremely Likely." 
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sometimes a response that did not fit into either of these categories was rewarded. A 
more appropriate label for this reward condition would be "reward noncontingency" 
because of the random relationship between subjects' responses and the points 
counter. Rosenfarb et al. 's (1993) and Neunaber's (1987) findings would suggest that 
both depressives and nondepressives would be able to recognize the lack of a 
contingency and would therefore not alter their behavior (desire and likelihood 
ratings) in any particular direction (i.e., no within-group differences). According to 
Ruehlman et al.s' (1985) findings, it was expected that between-group differences 
would be found because depressives were expected to make more negativistic ratings 
and fewer wishful ratings than nondepressives. To the extent that these between-
group differences were due to depressives making ratings similar to chance and 
nondepressives differing from chance, the separation hypothesis would receive 
secondary support from these findings. 
Dependent Variables 
The BDI scores, wishful thinking coping scores, and the subjects' desire and 
likelihood ratings were four important dependent variables in this study. That is, in 
order to relate the findings from this study to the existing literature, correlations 
between BDI scores and wishful thinking coping scores should replicate Vitaliano et 
al. 's (1985) findings. Desire and likelihood ratings were used to determine if 
previous findings for wishful thinking based on experimental definitions would be 
replicated. Additionally, the separation hypothesis suggests that wishful thinking 
coping items contain a desire component. Therefore, it was expected that a 
significant correlation between wishful thinking coping scores and desire ratings 
would be found. 
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Two additional dependent variables in this study reflect the subjects' degrees 
of wishful and negativistic thinking, respectively. Specifically, subjects received a 
score that reflected the percentage of wishful ratings as well as a score that reflected 
the percentage of negativistic ratings which they made. Finally, upon completing the 
desire and likelihood ratings, subjects rated their perceived control over accumulating 
points. This judgment of control was intended to be similar to Alloy and Abramson's 
(1979) measure in which subjects rated their perceived degree of control over getting 
a light to tum on. 
Hypotheses 
The following predictions are offered for the desire-likelihood reward contingencies 
(I-IV), coping style (V-VII), and judgments of control (VIII): 
I) Based on the experimental criteria for wishful and negativistic thinking, by 
chance alone, 27% of subjects' responses should be wishful thinking 
responses, 27% should be negativistic responses, and 46% should be 
"unclassified" responses that do not fit into either of the first two categories 
(e.g., a desire rating of "3" with any likelihood rating falls into this 
category). The separation hypothesis predicted that depressives' responses 
would be similar to chance responding in the baseline condition because 
their desire ratings were predicted to be "separated" from their likelihood 
ratings. Nondepressives were predicted to differ from chance primarily 
because they were expected to make higher wishful ratings and 
fewer negativistic ratings than would be expected by chance alone. This 
hypothesis would also support the findings by Ruehlman et al. (1985) that 
while nondepressives are more likely to make positive evaluations (i.e., 
wishful thinking), depressives are expected to engage in unbiased 
responding which would be neither wishful nor negativistic. 
11) Depressives and nondepressives should have a similar percentage of wishful 
thinking ratings in the wishful thinking reward condition because it 
was predicted that both groups would respond similarly to the wishful 
thinking reward contingency (Rosenfarb et al., 1993; Neunaber, 1987). It 
should be noted that this would represent a greater change for depressives, 
but not for nondepressives (who are already predicted to be making more 
wishful ratings than would be expected by chance). 
III) Similarly, depressives and nondepressives were predicted to have a similar 
percentage of negativistic ratings in the negativistic reward condition 
(Rosenfarb et al., 1993; Neunaber, 1987). This should represent a greater 
change for nondepressives who are expected to increase their negativistic 
ratings. 
IV) It was predicted that the random reward condition would have no effect on 
either desire or likelihood ratings for depressives or nondepressives. That 
is, because subjects in this condition would receive points regardless of 
whether their rating was wishful, negativistic, or "unclassified," they should 
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not change to a particular rating "style" because they are in a 
noncontingent reward condition (i.e., no within-group differences are 
expected). However, according to the separation hypothesis and 
to Ruehlman et al.s' (1985) findings, it was expected that between-group 
differences would be found because nondepressives were expected to make 
fewer negativistic ratings and more wishful ratings than depressives. Thus, 
between-group differences that are predicted to occur during baseline 
should persist during this condition. 
V) It was predicted that depression, as measured by the Beck Depression 
Inventory (BDI), would be positively correlated with the Wishful Thinking, 
the Avoidance, and the Blamed Self subscales of the WCCL scale. 
Depression was also predicted to be negatively correlated with the 
Problem-Focused and the Seeking Social Support WCCL subscales. These 
results would replicate Vitaliano et al. 's (1985) findings. 
VI) Similar to the WCCL subscales, it was predicted that BDI scores would 
correlate with the Aggression and the avoidant-like subscale of Substance 
Use on the CCSS (Jose, 1992). It was also predicted that there would be a 
negative correlation between the BDI scores and the constructive coping 
strategies seen in the Social Support, Rejuvenation, and the Problem 
Solving subscales. These predictions are based upon Vitaliano et al. 's 
(1985) findings in which depressives engaged in destructive or avoidant 
coping strategies. 
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VII) It was also predicted that there would be a significant negative correlation 
between BDI scores and Life Optimism Test (LOT) scores. This 
prediction would replicate findings from the validation of the LOT (Scheier 
& Carver, 1985). This measure was included as an addition to the coping 
measures. That is, optimism can be seen as an aspect of coping and 
therefore this measure may assist in explaining coping findings. Therefore, 
it was predicted that the LOT scores would correlate with the wishful 
thinking subscale of the WCCL. It was also expected that the LOT would 
correlate positively with wishful thinking percentages and negatively with 
negativistic thinking percentages. That is, as optimism increases, it would 
be expected that wishful thinking would be more likely and negativistic 
thinking would be less likely. 
VIII) Nondepressives were expected to make higher judgment of control ratings 
than depressives in the wishful reward condition because it was predicted 
that they would be more likely to demonstrate wishful thinking naturally, 
which would result in greater rewards in this condition (and consequently, 
a greater sense of control). Conversely, it was predicted that depressives 
would make higher judgment of control ratings than nondepressives in the 
negativistic thinking condition because the separation hypothesis suggests 
that depressives would be more likely to make negativistic ratings (27 % ) 
relative to nondepressives (significantly less than 27%) which would result 
in greater rewards in this condition. Finally, based on Alloy and 
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Abramson's (1979) findings, it was predicted that depressives would be 
more realistic than nondepressives and would make lower judgment of 






Depressed (N=47, 11 males, 36 females) and nondepressed (N=98, 38 males, 
60 females) Loyola University General Psychology students were identified using the 
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et al., 1961; see Appendix A). The BDI has 
demonstrated reliability and content, construct, and concurrent validity (Beck, Steer, 
& Garbin, 1988). Subjects with a BDI score of 10 or above were classified as at 
least mildly depressed (M = 17.00, SD = 6.27) and those with a score below 10 
were classified as nondepressed (M = 4.32, SD = 2.87). Subjects received credit 
for their General Psychology experiment participation requirement. 
Design 
To test the separation hypothesis using the experimental definition of wishful 
thinking, this study used a 2 (Group: depressed, nondepressed) x 3 (Reward 
Contingency condition: contingent on wishful thinking; contingent on not wishful 
thinking; random) x 2 (Time: baseline, reward) x 2 (Item Valence: positive, negative) 
x 2 (Item type: life events, dice game) x 2 (Rating Type: desirability, likelihood) 
factorial design. Group and Contingency were between-subjects variables and Time, 
Valence, Item Type, and Rating Type were within-subjects variables. The primary 
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dependent variables were the desire and likelihood ratings. Additional analyses were 
performed by transforming the desirability and likelihood ratings into wishful thinking 
and negativistic thinking percentage scores in order to assess the relationship between 
desire and likelihood for each item. These two scores were assigned to each subject 
based on the rules depicted in Table 2. Additionally, correlations between the BDI 
scores and coping scales and correlations between the BDI scores and desire ratings 
were performed. Finally, judgment of control ratings were also used in a separate 
analysis of variance in order to determine if any group differences existed as a 
function of the Contingency condition for subjects' judgments of control for obtaining 
points when making desire and likelihood ratings. 
Materials 
In addition to the BDI, subjects completed the following measures: 
Life Optimism Test (LOT). The LOT (Appendix B) is a 12 item paper-and-
pencil test which measures optimism in terms of outcome expectancies (Scheier & 
Carver, 1985). The LOT has been shown to have acceptable internal consistency 
(Cronbach's alpha = .76) and acceptable test-retest reliability (r = .79). In 
comparison to internal locus of control (r = .34), self-esteem (r = .48), hopelessness 
(r = - .4 7), and depression (r = - . 49), the LOT demonstrated a relationship in the 
expected direction which adds support for convergent validity. Additional! y, because 
these relationships were not overly strong, the LOT appears to have appropriate 
discriminant validity (Scheier & Carver, 1985). 
Table 2 
Re-scoring Rules for Wishful and Negativistic Percentage Scores 
Wishful Thinking 
Desire Rating < 3 and Likelihood Rating < 4 
Desire Rating > 3 and Likelihood Rating > 6 
Negativistic Thinking 
Desire Rating < 3 and Likelihood Rating > 6 
Desire Rating > 3 and Likelihood Rating < 4 
Note. Desire Ratings were made on a 5 point scale: 1 "Very Undesirable", 3 
"Neutral", and 5 "Very Desirable." Likelihood Ratings were made on a 9-point 
scale: 1 "Not at All Likely", 5 "50/50 Chance", and 9 "Extremely Likely." 
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The Ways of Coping Checklist (WCCL}. The instructions on the WCCL 
(Appendix C) request subjects to write down a recent stressful situation. Subjects are 
then instructed to give yes or no responses to whether they used a particular coping 
style to deal with the stressor they had written down. Subscale scores are obtained 
which can be used to determine subjects' most frequently used coping style. The 
subscales have been shown to have adequate internal consistency reliabilities (all rs > 
.73). Additionally, the scales demonstrated respectable construct and criterion-related 
validity (Vitaliano et al., 1985). 
Children's Coping Strategies Scale (CCSS). The CCSS (Appendix D) is a 
paper-and-pencil coping measure on which subjects rate various coping strategies that 
they employ on a 5-point Likert-type scale with descriptors ranging from "never" to 
"sometimes" to "always." Subjects were asked to make these ratings in terms of how 
they generally react to life events. This scale consists of five factors whose items 
yielded acceptable Cronbach alpha levels (all alphas > .601). This measure was 
included as an additional coping measure. 
Computer Program. Following the completion of these measures, subjects 
were seated at a computer terminal at which they made likelihood and desirability 
ratings for a total of 40 pairs of life events and 24 pairs of die rolling situations. The 
majority of the life events were selected from literature on the effects of positive and 
negative life events (Weinstein, 1980) and the remainder were generated by the 
author. Half of the life events in the current study were pleasant (positive) and half 
were unpleasant (negative). The dice items were chosen such that there was an 
objective probability of 50 percent for the likelihood of each dice roll. In addition, 
half of the dice events were negative (i.e., involved losing money) and half were 
positive (i.e., involved winning money). Dice and life events were randomly 
interspersed. For examples of the events, see Table 3 (for a complete listing of the 
items, see Appendix E). 
Subjects made the ratings for pairs of items (desirability and likelihood) 
consecutively, with rating order balanced. The likelihood scale was a 9-point scale 
with 11 1" representing "not at all likely," "5 11 representing "50-50 chance, 11 and "9" 
representing "extremely likely." The desirability scale was a 5-point scale with "l" 
meaning "very undesirable," "3" meaning "neutral," and "5" meaning "very 
desirable" (see Table 3). 
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It may be argued that concurrent presentation of likelihood and desire items 
could result in a demand characteristic that would encourage wishful thinking because 
subjects would be rating an item on both desirability and likelihood at the same time. 
This would make similar ratings more likely simply because subjects would be able to 
remember their previous rating. Such a demand characteristic would not only make 
wishful thinking ratings more likely, but would also dilute any hypothesized 
differences between depressives and nondepressives. In order to minimize such an 
effect, subjects were given a brief explanation about the differences between desire 
and likelihood ratings. Furthermore, the items were on different scales so as to avoid 
similar ratings because of identical scales. 
During the reward portion of the experiment, the computer program displayed 
Table 3 
Examples of Positive and Negative Life and Dice Items 
Positive Life Item 
How desirable is it when you receive an unexpected check in the mail? 
What is the likelihood of you receiving an unexpected check in the mail? 
Negative Life Item 
How desirable is it to be stopped for a speeding ticket? 
What is the likelihood that you will be stopped for a speeding ticket? 
Positive Dice Item 
If you roll a 6,7,9, or 10 with two dice, you win $5. 
What is the desirability of rolling a 6, 7, 9, or 10? 
What is the likelihood of rolling a 6, 7, 9, or 1 0? 
Negative Dice Item 
If you roll a 5, 6, 7, or 10 with two dice, you lose $5. 
What is the desirability of rolling a 5, 6, 7, or 10? 
What is the likelihood of rolling a 5, 6, 7, or 10? 
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a points counter in the bottom center of the screen that would increase according to 
the contingency criteria (see Table 1). Whenever subjects made a "correct" response 
(i.e., matched the reward contingency), the screen would flash a message that they 
made a correct response and their score would increase 50 points. 
Judgment of Control Questionnaire (JCO). The final measure required 
subjects to judge their degree of control for nine items that assessed different 
relationships between desire and likelihood ratings (see Appendix F). For example, 
one item asked, "To what extent did the score increase when you rated the likelihood 
of a desirable event as high?" This measure was designed to determine if subjects 
were able to make accurate judgments about the scoring rules that the computer 
program was using. 
Procedure 
After completing a written informed consent, subjects completed paper and 
pencil versions of the BDI, the WCCL, and the LOT. Following random assignment 
to one of the three contingencies, subjects were seated at the computer terminal. 
After receiving the initial instructions for the computer program, subjects made desire 
and likelihood ratings for half of the total pairs of items (i.e., half of the dice roll 
items and half of the life events items). These items were randomly selected for each 
subject. Subjects were then given the following verbal instructions: "From now on 
there will be a points counter at the bottom center of the screen. You will notice that 
the computer will give you points from time to time. Your goal is to get as many 
points as possible while still being as accurate in your ratings as possible. So try to 
see if you can see the relationship between the points you're getting and the answers 
you're giving. At the end of the experiment one subject will receive 30 dollars." 
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The money was used as an incentive to maintain subjects' motivation in the task. The 
winner was chosen randomly due to the fact that depending on the contingency 
condition subjects were assigned to, their ability to receive points was affected. After 
completing the computer program, subjects completed the JCQ to determine their 




There were two main categories of dependent variables in this study. First, in 
terms of the experimental definition of wishful thinking, desire and likelihood ratings 
were used. All analyses of these ratings involved standardized scores because the 
desire and likelihood ratings were made on different scales. For two additional 
analyses, these ratings were transformed into wishful thinking and negativistic 
thinking scores that reflected the association between desire and likelihood ratings 
(described below). Repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to 
analyze these data. The second category of dependent variables consisted of the 
coping measures (WCCL, CCSS), the Judgment of Control Questionnaire (JCQ), and 
the Life Optimism Test (LOT}. These scores were analyzed with correlational 
methods to determine the relationships between depression and these scales. 
Desire and Likelihood Ratings 
Analysis of variance (ANOV A) using standardized desire and likelihood 
ratings as the dependent variables (repeated measures) revealed no depressed -
nondepressed group differences for the Time (baseline, reward) and Contingency 
(contingent on wishful thinking, contingent on negativistic thinking, and random 
feedback) factors. That is, the effects of these manipulations did not interact with the 
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Group factor (depressed, nondepressed). In order to focus this discussion first on 
depressed - nondepressed differences (i.e., to determine processes that may differ as a 
function of depression), effects involving the Contingency and Time variables will be 
discussed at the end of this section. 
The 4-way interaction of Group (depressed, nondepressed) x Item Type (life, 
dice) x Rating Type (desire, likelihood) x Valence (positive, negative) was significant, 
E(l, 139) = 10.19, l! < .01 (Figure 1). Recall that while Group was a between-
subjects variable, Item Type, Rating Type, and Valence were within-subjects 
variables. In order to correct for the possibility of Type I errors due to the large 
number of analyses for simple effects, only simple effects with a probability of less 
than .01 were considered statistically significant. 
Looking first at dice items, there were no significant effects for Group, Item 
Valence, and Rating Type. Thus, there were no differences between depressed and 
nondepressed subject's ratings, nor were there differences in ratings between negative 
(losing) and positive (winning) items, or between desire and likelihood ratings. 
However, when life items were examined, the Group x Rating Type x Valence 
interaction was statistically significant, E(l, 139) = 16.43, l! < .001. Additional 
analyses indicated that for life items, the Group x Valence interaction for likelihood 
ratings was statistically significant, E(l, 139) = 22.70, l! < .001. Depressives rated 
positive life items as less likely than nondepressives (E(l, 139) = 24.57, l! < .001) 
and negative life items as more likely than nondepressives (E(l, 139) = 9.04, l! 
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Fig. 1. Group x Item Type x Rating Type x Valence Interaction. 
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Therefore, it appears that the major difference in rating styles between depressives 
and nondepressives stems from the likelihood ratings for life items and not from 
desirability ratings for either life or dice items. 
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In summary, nondepressed subjects seemed to be "wishful thinkers" for life 
items relative to depressed subjects as they rated positive life events to be more likely 
and negative events to be less likely to occur. Conversely, the analyses suggest that 
depressives seemed to be "negativistic thinkers" relative to nondepressives, rating 
positive life events as less likely and negative events as more likely. The reason that 
only "relative" claims regarding wishful thinking can be made is that it is difficult to 
determine the objective probability of the life events for the subjects. This problem 
was part of the rationale for including dice events, which were designed to have an 
objective probability (n = .50). However, depressed and nondepressed subjects did 
not differ in their likelihood ratings for dice events, and the mean likelihood rating 
across subjects was 5.11 (on a 1-9 scale with 5 representing a 50% chance), 
indicating that all subjects were fairly accurate for dice event likelihood ratings. 
Wishful Thinking Scores 
An examination of mean likelihood and desire ratings (as above) provides only 
incomplete information about subjects' wishful thinking "style." A more appropriate 
analysis examines the relationship between subjects' desire and likelihood ratings for 
each item. For example, on any given positive item, wishful thinking would be 
demonstrated by a subject rating desirability and likelihood as high. Negativistic 
thinking for a positive item would be indicated by a high desirability rating and a low 
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likelihood rating. 
In order to derive a measure of the wishful and negativistic "rating styles" for 
all subjects, scores were calculated for each subject which represented the percentage 
of desire-likelihood pairs answered in a wishful "style" and the percentage of desire-
likelihood pairs answered in a negativistic "style." These two percentages were 
calculated using a similar rules table for classifying desire and likelihood pairs as for 
the Contingency condition (see Tables 1 and 2). The only difference between this 
scoring and the method used for the reward contingency was that in assigning wishful 
and negativistic scores for this data analysis (i.e., the re-scoring of desire and 
likelihood ratings), the middle portions of the scales were not counted towards either 
type of rating style. That is, when the desire rating was 3 ("neutral") and the 
likelihood ratings was 4, 5, or 6, (near "50-50" chance), subjects' ratings were not 
scored as either wishful or negativistic thinking. 
Thus, wishful scores represent the percentage of items that a subject rated as 
being both highly desirable (rating of 4 or 5) and highly likely (rating of 7, 8, or 9) 
or both highly undesirable (rating of 1 or 2) and highly unlikely (rating of 1, 2, or 3). 
On the other hand, negativistic scores indicated the percentage of items that a subject 
rated as both highly desirable (rating of 4 or 5) and highly unlikely (rating of 1, 2, or 
3) or that were rated as being highly undesirable (rating of 1 or 2) and highly likely 
(rating of 7, 8, or 9). It should be noted that these two types of rating styles did not 
account for all of the ratings that subjects made because these scores only included 
items where subjects made extreme ratings for both desirability and likelihood. In 
cases where the ratings for either desirability or likelihood fell in the middle range, 
no wishful or negativistic thinking scores were given in this re-scoring. 
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A Group x Item Type x Timex Contingency x Valence ANOVA with wishful 
thinking scores as the dependent variable revealed a statistically significant Item Type 
(Life, Dice) x Group interaction, .E(2, 139) = 11.59, n < .01 (see Figure 2). 
Simple comparisons indicated that there were significant Group differences for life 
events (.E(l, 139) = 11.55, n < .01), such that nondepressives had higher wishful 
thinking scores for life events than depressives (49.1 % and 40.8%, respectively). 
Group differences in wishful thinking were not observed for dice items. Additionally, 
there was a significant main effect of Item Type, .E(l, 139) = 161.59, n < .001, 
which indicated that both depressives and nondepressives had higher wishful thinking 
scores for life items (M = 46.3%) than for dice items (M = 19.5%). 
A second interaction was observed between Time and Contingency, .E(2, 139) 
= 10.15, n < .001. As with the previous analyses of desire and likelihood ratings, 
the interaction of Time and Contingency will be discussed at the end of this section 
following presentation of all depressed-nondepressed differences. 
The absence of a Group x Time or a Group x Time x Contingency interaction 
indicates that depressed and nondepressed subjects' wishful thinking styles did not 
differ from baseline to reward, nor were they differentially affected by the 
Contingency manipulation. 
Negativistic Thinking Scores 



























Fig. 2. Group x Item Type with Percentage of Wishful Thinking 
Responses as the Dependent Variable. 
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yielded slightly different results. There was a significant Time x Contingency 
interaction, f(2, 139) = 3.65, n < .05 (described below), and a significant main 
effect of Group, f(l, 139) = 8.93, n < .01. Regarding the Group main effect, 
depressives made significantly more negativistic ratings (M = 18.4%) than 
nondepressives (M = 13.1 % ) across all conditions. Thus, depressives were more 
likely to perceive highly desirable life and dice items as very unlikely and highly 
undesirable life and dice items as very likely relative to nondepressives (at baseline 
and across the three reward contingency conditions). 
Rating Style Percentages 
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Recall that chance responding would be indicated by 27% wishful thinking, 
27% negativistic thinking, and 46% "unclassified" responding. Based on the 
separation hypothesis, it was predicted that during the baseline condition, depressives' 
responses would not differ from chance responding. As predicted, depressives' 
ratings did not differ from chance responding (X:(2) = 3. 76, p > .05). Also as 
predicted, nondepressives' ratings during baseline differed from chance responding 
(X2(2) = 11.77, p < .05) such that they made more wishful ratings (36.7%) and less 
negativistic ratings (12.5%) than would be expected by chance alone (27% for each; 
see Table 4). 
Ways of Coping Checklist (WCCL} 
Correlations between BDI and the WCCL subscales replicated Vitaliano et 
al. 's (1985) findings regarding the correlation between depression and wishful 
thinking; as depression increased, the tendency to use wishful thinking as a coping 
Table 4 























response also increased. As predicted, BDI scores were positively correlated with 
wishful thinking (r = . 271, n < . 01), avoidance (r = .460, n < . 001), and blaming-
self strategies (I = .315, n < .001), as measured by the WCCL. BDI scores were 
negatively correlated with problem-focused coping (I = -.386, 12 < .001) and showed 
a trend to be negatively correlated with the social-support seeking subscale (I = 
-.175, ll < .06). 
Children's Coping Strategies Scale (CCSS) 
Four out of five of the predictions for the subscales on the CCSS were 
supported. BDI scores were positively correlated with aggression (I = .384, 12 < 
.001) and substance use (r = .265, p < .01), but were negatively correlated with 
rejuvenation (I = -.284, p < .01) and social support (I = -.191, p < .01). The 
only prediction that was not supported was the predicted negative correlation between 
problem solving and the BDI (I = -.093, n > .05). 
Life Optimism Test (LOT} Ratings 
As predicted, there was a significant negative correlation between the BDI and 
LOT scores, r = -.677, p < .001. This served to replicate Scheier and Carver's 
(1985) validation study of the LOT. Additionally, to the extent that optimism is an 
aspect of coping, this finding may help clarify some of the previous findings for 
likelihood ratings. Depressed and nondepressed subjects differed only in their 
likelihood ratings. The correlation between the BDI and the LOT suggests that the 
lower likelihood ratings depressives made for life events may be due to a more 
"pessimistic" outlook than nondepressives. However, LOT scores did not correlate 
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with likelihood ratings (r =.005, n.s.). 
As predicted, LOT scores correlated significantly in a positive direction with 
wishful thinking scores (r = .211, J2 < .05) as well as negatively with negativistic 
thinking scores (r = -.261, J2 < .01). This suggests that the experimental definitions 
of wishful thinking and negativistic thinking employed in this study are related to 
optimism (measured in terms of coping items). Interestingly, LOT scores were not 
correlated with any of the CCSS subscales and only with the wishful thinking coping 
subscale on the WCCL, r = .192, 12 < .05. Given the relatively low correlations 
between the LOT and likelihood ratings, wishful thinking, negativistic thinking, and 
wishful thinking coping subscale of the WCCL, it appears that these variables are 
conceptually similar to optimism but that they also differ from it. 
Judgment of Control Questionnaire (JCO) Ratings 
Contrary to expectations, a MANOV A with all of the judgment of control 
items yielded no Group x Contingency effects on the judgment of control ratings, .E(2, 
136) = 0.72, n.s. However, there was a significant effect of the Contingency 
manipulation (E(2, 136) = 16.33, 12 < .001), such that those who were in the wishful 
thinking Contingency condition gave higher judgment of control ratings across all 
items (M = 52.46) than those who were in the negativistic thinking Contingency 
condition (M = 39.33), .E(l, 87) = 11.61, 12 < .01, and subjects in the random 
Contingency condition (M = 30.44), .E(l,93) = 33.20, 12 < .001. Subjects in the 
random Contingency condition tended to judge their control as lower than subjects in 
the negativistic Contingency condition, .E(l, 92) = 4.74, J2 < .05. Additionally, 
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given that the Contingency manipulation should have resulted in differential judgments 
of control for specific items, ANOV As were performed using individual items as the 
dependent variable. All analyses using the judgment of control items individually 
yielded no significant differences for Group or contingency manipulation conditions. 
Replication of the Contradiction in the Wishful Thinking Literature 
The contradiction between the coping literature (i.e., as depression increases, 
wishful thinking increases) and the experimental literature (i.e., wishful thinking 
observed in nondepressives) was found in this study. Specifically, as mentioned 
above, BDI scores correlated with the wishful thinking subscale of the WCCL, which 
replicated the coping literature findings. The experimental literature was replicated 
with the finding that depressives were less likely to give high likelihood ratings for 
desirable events and low likelihood ratings for undesirable events (i.e., wishful 
thinking) than nondepressives. It would be expected that the measure of wishful 
thinking used in this study (i.e., the relationship between desire and likelihood 
ratings) would not correlate with the coping measure of wishful thinking because of 
the contradiction already noted. This is exactly what occurred (r = .00, n.s.). That 
is, this study suggests that there is no relationship between wishful thinking measured 
by coping scales and the wishful thinking measured experimentally (i.e., desire and 
likelihood ratings). 
Recall that wishful thinking coping items were conceptualized as having a 
desire component. It was hypothesized that wishful thinking in the coping literature 
would be more related to desire ratings than to likelihood ratings. To test the 
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hypothesis that the wishful coping items would be more related to desirability than to 
likelihood ratings, correlations between the wishful thinking score from the WCCL 
and both desire and likelihood ratings were calculated. However, results indicated no 
statistically significant correlations between the coping wishful thinking score and the 
desire or likelihood ratings (I = -.041 and r =.006, respectively). Essentially, the 
experimental wishful thinking measure does not correlate in any way with the wishful 
thinking coping measure. 
Correlation of BDI scores with Wishful and Negativistic Scores 
The correlation between the wishful thinking scores and BDI scores was not 
significant (I = -.107, 12 > . 05). Interestingly, the negativistic thinking scores were 
significantly correlated with BDI scores in a positive direction, with greater 
depression associated with more negativistic thinking (I = . 219, 12 < . 01). 
Time and Contingency Findings 
As stated earlier, the interactions for the desire and likelihood ratings that have 
been described were collapsed across the Time and Contingency factors because these 
factors did not interact with the Group variable. The Time variable refers to the 
within-subject manipulation of baseline and reward conditions, and the Contingency 
variable refers to the between-subjects reward manipulation (reward for wishful 
thinking, reward for negativistic thinking, random reward). There was a significant 
4-way interaction involving the variables of Time, Contingency, Valence, and Rating 
Type, F(2, 139) = 5.66, 12 < .01 (see Figure 3). Additional analyses indicated that 














Wishful Nonwishful Random 
Feedback Condition 











































Fig. 3. Time x Contingency x Valence x Rating Type with Ratings 




Contingency, Valence, and Rating Type (12s > .01). Thus, subjects' desire and 
likelihood ratings did not differ at baseline as a function of Item Valence and 
Contingency condition (because the Contingency condition had not been implemented 
at baseline, no effect of Contingency would be expected). When looking at the 
reward period, however, a statistically significant interaction was found between 
Valence, Contingency condition, and Rating Type (E(2, 139) = 4.97, l2 < .01), 
suggesting that the Contingency manipulation produced an effect on desire and 
likelihood ratings. 
In order to interpret the effects of the Contingency manipulation, subjects' 
desire and likelihood ratings were compared in a between-subjects analysis across the 
three levels of Contingency (reward for wishful thinking, reward for negativistic 
thinking, and random reward). Additionally, subjects' desire and likelihood ratings 
were analyzed using a within-subjects design to compare ratings made during baseline 
vs. after the reward condition began. 
Regarding the within-subjects analyses, no significant baseline-reward 
differences were found except for trends (recall the more stringent probability criteria 
of .01 because of the large number of tests) toward differences for negative event 
likelihood ratings in the wishful thinking condition (E(l, 44) = 4.85, 12 < .05) and in 
the negativistic thinking condition (E(l, 45) = 4.59, l2 < .05). Specifically, subjects 
in the wishful thinking reward condition tended to rate negative items as less likely 
relative to their baseline ratings, and subjects who were rewarded for negativistic 
thinking tended to rate negative items as more likely relative to their baseline ratings. 
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This pattern of change in likelihood ratings is consistent with gaining more points in 
the wishful and negativistic conditions, respectively. As predicted by Rosenfarb et 
al. 's (1993) and Neunaber's (1987) findings, it is important to stress that this pattern 
was observed for both depressives and nondepressives. There were no baseline-
reward differences for desire ratings (ns > . 05). 
Looking next at the ratings made following the implementation of rewards 
(reward level of the Time variable), results provided more support for an effect of the 
between-subject reward condition. Specifically, further analyses indicated that for 
likelihood ratings for positive items, there was a trend for a difference between 
reward for wishful thinking and reward for negativistic thinking, such that those in 
the wishful thinking condition gave higher likelihood ratings than those in the 
negativistic thinking condition (E(l, 91) = 4.46, 12 < .05). For negative items, there 
was a significant difference such that the subjects in the wishful thinking reward 
condition gave lower likelihood ratings than the subjects in the negativistic thinking 
reward condition (E(l, 91) = 8.06, 12 < .01). 
In summary, the findings provide partial support for an effect of the 
Contingency manipulations. Specifically, subjects in the wishful thinking reward 
condition gave lower likelihood ratings for negative events and tended to rate positive 
events as more likely than subjects in the negativistic thinking condition. Thus, in 
both the wishful and negativistic reward conditions, subjects seemed to adjust 
likelihood ratings (rather than desire ratings) to be appropriately wishful or 
negativistic given the contingency condition. As predicted, when rewards were 
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random, subjects did not significantly change their desire or likelihood ratings. 
As mentioned above, when wishful thinking scores were calculated to reflect 
the match between desire and likelihood ratings, an interaction was found between 
Time and Contingency, I:(2, 139) = 10.15, n < .001 (see Figure 4). A simple 
effects analysis indicated that there was no significant effect of Contingency on the 
wishful thinking baseline scores (n > .05), which indicates that random assignment 
created equal groups (in terms of wishful thinking) prior to beginning the reward 
manipulation. However, there was a significant difference between baseline and 
reward for the wishful thinking reward condition, such that wishful thinking scores 
increased from baseline to reward (E(l, 44) = 15.20, ll < .001). Also, there was a 
significant difference between the wishful and negativistic conditions for the wishful 
thinking scores following the reward manipulation, such that subjects in the wishful 
thinking condition had higher wishful thinking scores than subjects in the negativistic 
thinking condition (E(l, 89) = 16.99, ll < .001). Similarly, subjects in the wishful 
reward condition had higher wishful thinking scores than subjects in the random 
reward condition (E(l, 94) = 8.78, ll < .01). These findings suggest that the reward 
manipulation affected wishful thinking responses such that those who were rewarded 
for it increased wishful thinking relative to subjects who were not rewarded for 
wishful thinking. 
A similar, although not as strong, effect occurred with the negativistic thinking 
scores (see Figure 5). Specifically, there was also a statistically significant Timex 
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more stringent probability criteria adopted (n < .01), there were only several trends 
in the simple effects analyses. Results were similar to those observed for wishful 
thinking scores, but in the opposite direction. Subjects who were rewarded for 
negativistic thinking tended to have higher negativistic thinking scores than those in 
the wishful thinking reward condition, E(l, 139) = 6.79, 12 < .05). However, 
subjects in the negativistic reward condition did not differ significantly from subjects 
in the random reward condition, E(l, 95) = 3.02, 12 < .10. There was also only a 
trend toward a difference between the baseline and reward conditions of the 
negativistic condition, E(l, 45) = 5.09, 12 < .05. Taking the wishful and negativistic 
findings together, the findings suggest that the wishful thinking reward manipulation 
altered subjects' wishful rating styles whereas the negativistic thinking reward 
manipulations had only a minor effect on subjects' negativistic rating style. 
A Brief Review 
CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
Findings in the coping literature have indicated that depression is positively 
correlated with a wishful thinking coping style (Vitaliano et al., 1985). The coping 
literature assesses wishful thinking in terms of the number of strategies a person uses 
that have a "wishful" or desire component (e.g., "I wished that a miracle would 
happen."). As a subject endorses a greater percentage of the wishful thinking items, 
they are said to be more likely to employ wishful thinking as one of their primary 
coping mechanisms. 
Experimental research has defined wishful thinking differently than the coping 
literature. That is, wishful thinking has been defined as the tendency to rate the 
likelihood of positive, desirable events as higher than the actual base rate of 
occurrence, and the tendency to rate the likelihood of negative, undesirable events as 
lower than the actual base rate (Cronbach & Davis, 1944; Marks, 1951). 
Alloy and Abramson (1979) have demonstrated that depressives are more 
realistic than nondepressives in making judgments of control for positive and negative 
outcomes. For the purposes of the present study, the findings of the depressive 
realism work were seen as similar to the earlier experimental wishful thinking 
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research. That is, with respect to wishful thinking, it was assumed that high 
judgments of control for positive events are similar in meaning to high likelihood 
ratings for positive events. Given this view, nondepressives exhibited wishful 
thinking in the original depressive realism work since they rated their judgments of 
control for obtaining positive outcomes as higher than was objectively true. 
Depressives, on the other hand, were more accurate in their judgments of control 
(although still slightly optimistic). The present study attempted to clarify the apparent 
contradiction between depressives engaging in wishful thinking (based on the coping 
literature) versus depressives being more realistic (based on the depressive realism 
literature). 
It was hypothesized that the difference in findings was the result of different 
methodologies. The coping studies differed from the depressive realism experiments 
because in the coping research, subjects were presented with items that incorporated a 
desire statement (e.g., "I wished that a miracle would happen."). The depressive 
realism methodology requested degree of control ratings and controlled desire by 
manipulating valence of outcomes. It was hypothesized that the difference in findings 
between the coping and depressive realism literature could be explained by 
depressives separating their desire from their likelihood ratings in the depressive 
realism studies. In terms of the depressive realism task (Alloy & Abramson, 1979), 
the separation hypothesis would suggest that depressives made accurate judgment of 
control ratings because they were not affected by their desires. However, the coping 
literature used items in which desire statements were very salient. As a result, 
separation of desire and belief was not possible, perhaps leading depressives to 
endorse more wishful thinking items. 
Findings 
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Overall, this study yielded mixed support for the separation hypothesis. The 
strongest support for this hypothesis came from the finding that depressives' rating 
styles (wishful, negativistic, and unclassified) of desire-likelihood pairs did not differ 
significantly from chance whereas nondepressives' rating styles differed significantly. 
Recall that chance responding was assumed to indicate a cognitive separation of desire 
and likelihood ratings. 
One of the key aspects of the separation hypothesis that was not supported by 
this study was the expectation that the wishful thinking coping items would correlate 
with desire ratings. That is, it was suggested that the coping scales utilized 
statements that were essentially desire statements whereas the experimental method 
presumably separated desire from likelihood components. This hypothesis was tested 
in this study by observing the correlation between subjects' desire ratings for the dice 
and life items with their wishful thinking coping score. In essence, this analysis 
assumed that subjects' general desirability ratings of items would be related to their 
desire for the various wishful thinking coping items. Contrary to the prediction from 
the separation hypothesis, this study found no relationship between desire ratings and 
wishful thinking coping scores. 
An alternative way to understand wishful thinking is to compare depressives' 
responses relative to nondepressives' responses. As predicted, depressives engaged in 
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significantly more negativistic thinking relative to nondepressives and nondepressives 
engaged in significantly more wishful thinking relative to depressives. When these 
group comparisons are made it appears that depressives may be characterized as 
negativistic thinkers, which would support current cognitive theories of depression 
(e.g., Beck, 1976). However, given that depressives were "evenhanded" across 
rating styles - neither wishful nor negativistic - and it was nondepressives who 
demonstrated high wishful thinking and low negativistic ratings styles, depression may 
be best characterized as the absence of wishful thinking tendencies rather than the 
presence of negativistic thinking. This is consistent with other research which 
suggests depressives fail to use self-serving biases that are typical of nondepressed 
individuals (Alloy & Abramson, 1988). 
In general, the predictions regarding the correlations between BDI scores and 
the WCCL subscales were supported. BDI scores were found to be positively 
correlated with Wishful Thinking, the Avoidance and the Blamed Self subscales of the 
WCCL. Additionally, the predicted negative correlation between BDI scores and 
Problem-Focused coping was supported. There was only a trend for the predicted 
negative correlation between BDI scores and the Social Support subscale. 
Similarly, most of the predicted correlations between the BDI scores and the 
CCSS subscales were also supported. The hypothesized positive correlations between 
BDI scores and Aggression and the Substance-Use subscale on the CCSS were 
supported, as were the predicted negative correlations between the Rejuvenation and 
the Social Support subscales. However, the predicted negative correlation between 
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BDI and Problem-Solving was not supported. 
Taken together, the findings for the correlations between the coping subscales 
and the BDI scores suggest depressives are more likely to engage in behavior that 
tends to be passive in terms of addressing the problem (e.g., wishful thinking, 
avoidance, blamed self on the WCCL, aggression and substance use on the CCSS) 
while nondepressives are more likely to engage in active coping styles that attempt to 
change the situation (e.g., problem solving on the WCCL, social support and 
rejuvenation on the CCSS). These findings were not only important for replicating 
the findings in the literature, but they also support Neunaber's (1987) findings which 
suggested that depressives' passive coping strategies may reflect a motivational deficit 
as opposed to a cognitive difference in comparison to nondepressives. Therefore, 
rather than initiating an active behavioral response, depressives are more likely than 
nondepressives to engage in a more passive, nonactive response. 
In addition to replicating Scheier and Carver's (1985) findings, the LOT 
provided some insight into the wishful thinking coping measure. That is, the positive 
correlation between the LOT and the wishful coping measure suggests that these two 
constructs share common features. This suggests that engaging in wishful thinking as 
a way of coping with a situation involves some degree of optimism. To the extent 
that optimism is an aspect of coping, this finding may clarify some of the previous 
findings for depressed-nondepressed differences for likelihood ratings. The negative 
correlation between the BDI and the LOT suggests that the higher likelihood ratings 
nondepressives made for life events may be due to a more "optimistic" outlook than 
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depressives. 
No group differences were found in terms of the judgment of control ratings. 
This may have been due to the complicated nature of the judgment of control ratings 
(see Appendix H). For example, one of the items read: "To what extent did the score 
increase when you rated the likelihood of a desirable event as high?" After 
completing all of the computer desire and likelihood ratings and after reading a 
number of these types of items with various combinations of high, low, desirable and 
undesirable, the task may have become too difficult for subjects to understand clearly 
the relationships involved. 
Integration of the Findings 
Given the mixed support for the hypotheses, the following will be an attempt 
to integrate the various findings and hypotheses into a coherent description of the 
study results. First, Vitaliano et al. 's (1987) findings regarding the positive 
correlation between depression and wishful thinking as a coping style were replicated. 
Second, to the extent that the current experimental definition of wishful thinking 
(based on desire and likelihood ratings) replicates the methodology of Alloy and 
Abramson's (1979) depressive realism work, the depressive realism findings were 
replicated in that depressives engaged in less wishful thinking (measured with desire 
and likelihood ratings) than nondepressives for life items. However, both depressives 
and nondepressives made realistic ratings for the dice items (see below for more 
discussion of depressive realism). Third, and perhaps most importantly, this study 
clearly indicated that no relationship exists between the experimental and the coping 
definition of wishful thinking. Different methods for measuring "wishful thinking" 
resulted in markedly different interpretations of the relationship between depression 
and wishful thinking. 
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An important issue in wishful thinking research concerns realism, that is, are 
depressed or nondepressed subjects realistic when considering the likelihood of 
positive and negative events? Is it realistic to engage in wishful thinking coping 
strategies? In fact, Alloy and Abramson (1979) found that in some cases depressives 
were optimistic (not realistic), but because nondepressives were even more optimistic, 
depressives were said to be realistic. The issue seems to be whether one chooses to 
use an objective probability against which to compare depressives' ratings or whether 
to use a relative comparison with nondepressives. Because the only items in this 
study that had an objective probability were the dice items (for which there were no 
depressed-nondepressed differences), this study suggests that with dice items, both 
depressives and nondepressives were realistic. This finding neither confirms nor 
offers contradictory evidence for the depressive realism hypothesis because no 
depressed-nondepressed differences were found for the objective dice items. 
The depressed-nondepressed differences for life events may be due to life 
events being more salient to the subjects, and thereby involved the subjects in the task 
more than did the dice items. Salience has been found to influence wishful thinking 
(Weinstein, 1980). It may also be that wishful and negativistic biases are manifested 
only in scenarios that involve ambiguous, nonobjective probabilities, such as life 
events. Previous research has demonstrated that cognitive biases do not occur in 
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situations in which there are unambiguous response expectations (e.g., Dykman, 
Abramson, Alloy, & Hartlage, 1989). Thus, wishful thinking biases may only occur 
for ambiguous life events. 
While the lack of a depressed-nondepressed difference in wishful thinking for 
dice roll items may not contribute toward addressing the separation hypothesis, it 
contributes to a greater understanding of the depressive realism debate. Ackermann 
and DeRubeis (1991) claim that Golin et al. 's (1977) findings were not applicable to 
the depressive realism hypothesis because Golin et al. had subjects make confidence 
ratings instead of likelihood ratings for dice rolls. Golin et al. (1977) observed 
depressive realism for their confidence in rolling winning dice rolls; that is, 
depressives were less confident than nondepressives. However, Ackermann and 
DeRubeis (1991) suggest that Golin et al. observed depressive realism because of 
their use of confidence ratings. When likelihood ratings are used, as in the current 
study, depressive realism, in which depressives demonstrate less optimistic bias 
relative to nondepressives, did not occur for the dice roll items. 
Because it seems possible that having subjects make likelihood ratings instead 
of confidence ratings may have yielded different results, one of the assumptions of 
this study becomes questionable. That is, this study assumed that high judgment of 
control ratings for positive events and high likelihood ratings for positive events both 
represent wishful thinking. Ackermann and DeRubeis (1991) would likely suggest 
that this assumption was relatively weak, as they note that depressive realism findings 
may occur for confidence but not for likelihood ratings. Similarly, likelihood ratings 
may not be comparable to judgment of control ratings. This again suggests that 
different methods for measuring wishful thinking (in this case, choosing to use 
confidence, likelihood, or judgment of control ratings) appear to result in different 
findings. 
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In addition to the wishful thinking depressed-nondepressed differences, it was 
found that wishful thinking could be manipulated experimentally. That is, subjects 
who were rewarded for engaging in wishful thinking exhibited more wishful thinking 
than subjects who were rewarded for engaging in negativistic thinking. To the extent 
that the judgment of control questions measured awareness of wishful thinking 
contingencies, it appears that subjects were not aware of the contingencies necessary 
to receive points. To extend this line of reasoning further, these findings could be 
used to support a view that one technique to treat depression would be to set up 
contingencies so that depressives are rewarded for engaging in wishful thinking. The 
findings of this study suggest two areas for future research. First, it seems that there 
has been a lack of studies examining depressives' awareness of and ability to respond 
to different contingencies. More research is required to assess differences between 
depressed and nondepressed subjects' behavioral response to environmental 
contingencies. Past research has focused on subjects' awareness of contingencies, but 
more research is needed to examine whether depressed and nondepressed subjects 
differ in their ability to learn contingencies, particularly following changes in 
contingencies. Second, it is not clear from this study whether altering depressives' 
responses affects their mood state. Future studies in this area should examine 
whether manipulating depressives' response styles to be more wishful leads to more 
positive moods. 
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As discussed, one of the key aspects of the separation hypothesis suggested 
that the wishful thinking coping items would correlate with desire ratings. Results of 
the current study did not support this hypothesis. However, to test this hypothesis 
directly, subjects in a future study should be given the WCCL and then, as part of 
another task, should rate the desirability and the likelihood of each of the wishful 
thinking coping outcomes (e.g., How desirable would it be for a miracle to happen 
which would eliminate the stressful experience?). The separation hypothesis suggests 
that the desirability ratings for the coping strategies would be correlated with the 
wishful thinking scores whereas the likelihood ratings would be significantly less 
correlated (if at all) with the wishful thinking coping scale. 
Finally, depressed mood in this sample of depressed college students did not 
affect ratings of desirability for positive and negative events. To the extent that these 
desirability ratings reflect preferences for positive and negative events, depressives 
and nondepressives appear to be similar in their preferences. However, the two 
groups did differ in their likelihood ratings -- particularly for personally-relevant life 
events. If the likelihood ratings reflect differing cognitive processes between 
depressed and nondepressed subjects, these findings suggest that wishful thinking ( or 
alternatively, negativistic thinking), is a function of subjects' beliefs in the likelihood 
of positive and negative events, rather than their desires for these events to occur. 
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APPENDIX A 
BECK DEPRESSION INVENTO}ly 
BECK II-,"YE.'ITORY 
Narne ____________________________ Date ____________ _ 
On this questionnaire arc groups of statements. Please read each group of statements carefully. Then pick 
out the one statement in each group which best describes the way you have been feeling the PAST WEEK. 
INCLUDING TODAY! Circle the number beside the statement you picked. If several statements in the group 
seem to apply equally well. circle each one. Be sure to read all the statements in each group before 
making your choice. 
0 I do no< fc,:l ,.d. 
I I fc,:l s.od. 
2 I am s.d •ll the time Uld I can ·t snap 0111 of it. 
3 I am so sad or unhappy that I can't s1""1 it. 
2 0 I am n01 pamcularly discouraged about the future. 
I I feel discouraged about the future. 
2 I feel I have nothing to look forward to. 
3 I feel that the future is hopeless and that things cann01 
improve. 
3 0 I do nOI feel like a failure. 
I I feel I have failed more than the average penon. 
2 As I look back on my life. all I ca.n sec is• lot of failures. 
3 I feel I am a complete fatlure as a penon. 
4 0 I get ,. much ..,,is faction out of thinas as I used 10. 
I I don ·1 ""JOY th1n1s rhe way I used re. 
2 I don ·1 get real sarrsfaction out of anything ,nymoro. 
I •m diss.11stie<J or bored wirh everything. 
5 0 I don't feel pa11icularly pilty. 
I I feel guilty a good pan of the time. 
2 I feel quite auilty most of the time. 
I feel pilty •ll of the time. 
6 0 I don ·1 fee! I ,m being punished. 
I I feel I may be punished. 
2 I ex~ to be punishe<J. 
3 I feel I am being punished. 
7 0 I don't feel dis.ppointe<J in myself. 
I l am disappcunte<J in myself. 
2 I am disausted w11h myself. 
3 I ha1e mys.:lf. 
8 0 I don ·1 feel I am any wooe than anybody else. 
I I am cnucaJ of myself for my wululeues or miscues. 
2 I blame myself all the time for my faults. 
ll O I have not lost interest in 01her people. 
I I am less interosred in 0<her people rhan I uscu tu be. 
2 I have lost most of my interosr 1n o<her people. 
3 I have lost all of my in1eresr in ocher people. 
1.3 0 I ma.lte decisions about as well as I ever coul<l. 
I I put off ma.Icing decisions more than I used to. 
2 l have greater difficalty in making decisions rhan before. 
3 I can't m.ue decisions ar all anymore. 
14 0 I don't feel I look any worse rha.n I used to. 
I I am worried that I '1n1 looking old or unattnctive. 
2 I feel thai rherc aro permanent changes in my appear.1n,c 
that make me look unattracrive. 
3 l believe that I look ugly. 
15 0 I can wort .oout as well as beforo. 
I It ta.Ices an extn effort re get sraned at doing somethin11. 
2 I have 10 push myself very hard to do anything. 
3 I ca.n 't do any work at all. 
16 0 I can sleep as well as usu•I. 
I I don 1 slee;, as well as I used 10. 
2 1 wa.lce up 1·2 hours earlier than usual and tin<! ir hard to ger 
back to slee;,. · 
3 I wake up several hours earlier than I used 10 and cannor ~et 
back to sic:;,. 
17 0 I don't set moro 11rod than usual. 
I I set tired moro easily than I used to. 
2 I &et rired from doing almost anything. 
3 I am too tired 10 do anything. 
II O My 'l'PC!ite is no wo= rha.n usual. 
I My ~re is noc as &ood as 't cse-d 10 be. 
2 My appeme is much wo= now. 
3 I h.ave 110 &!)petite ll all anymore. 
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3 I blame myself for evaythinc bad mac happens. 
9 0 I don ·1 have 111y U'IOU&ftlS of killi111 myself. 
1, O I haven °I !OSI much weight. if any. lately. 
I I h.ave !OSI mon, than 5 pounds. I am purposely trying 10 1,o,c we: 
2 l h.ave lost more than 10 pounds. by eaunc !es,. Yes__ ~"-
3 I h.ave !OSI more th.an I 5 pounds. 
I I ha•e thou1nu o( kiJlia1 myself. bul I would noc c:arry 
them OUI. 
I would lib lo lr.ill myself. 
J I would lull myself if I had the c~. 
10 O I don ·1 cry any more than usual. 
I I cry rrx:,n r,ow rhan I used to. 
2 I cry •ll the time r,ow. 
I used 10 be ~le 10 cry. bu1 110w I aa ·1 cry even thoucJ! I 
,.ant to. 
11 0 I am r10 rrx:,n ,mtated r,ow than I ever am. 
I set annoyed or ,mtared more easily rhan I used ro. 
2 I feel ,mwed all !he rime now. 
3 I don·, ~ ,mwed :u all by rhc th1np rlw used 10 imuie 
me. 
20 O I am no more worried a.bout my health than u,ual. 
I I am womed about p/lys,cal problems such a. .1che, and 
paim; or uput stomach; or constipation. 
2 l am very womed about p/lysical probletns and 11 ·s h.ir<l tu 
thin.k of muc:i else. 
3 I am so wonie<J about my p/lysicaJ problems 1ha1 I canner 
minx about 111ythin1 else. 
ll O I h.ave i,oc noticed any recent chanae in my intet'CSI in "'·'· 
I I am less iru=sted in sex tlwl I used 10 be. 
2 I am much les.s in1e=ted in sex now. 
3 I have lost interest in su completely. 
Rc;,roduct1on .,.,thc,,1 wL'>or's express wria.i:n consc111 is nee permitted. Additional copies u,d/or permission 10 use rhis sc.a!e may be OOtained 
from: CE."fr~ FOR COGNTT1VE TiiERAi'Y. Room 602. 133 §oulh 36th Sa=t. P!uJadelplua. PA 19104 
APPENDIX B 
LIFE OPTIMISM TEST 
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LOT 
Please indicate the degree to which you agree with each of the items 
given below using the following scale: 
0 = strongly disagree 
1 disagree 
2 = neutral 
3 = agree 
4 strongly agree 
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Please be as accurate and honest as you can, and try not to let your 
answer to any one question influence answers to other questions. There 













In uncertain times, I usually expect the best. 
It's easy for me to relax. 
If something can go wrong for me, it will. 
I always look on the bright side of things. 
I'm always optimistic about my future. 
I enjoy my friends a lot. 
It's important for me to keep_busy. 
I hardly ever expect things_to_.go my way. 
Things never work out the way I want them to. . .. 
I don't get upset too easily. 
I'm a believer in the idea that "every cloud has a silve.r 
lining". 
I rarely count on good things happening to me. 
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APPENDIX C 
WAYS OF COPING CHECKLIST 
WCCL 
Instructions: Please recall the most recent stressful event or 
situation that you have faced. By 'stressful' we mean a situation 
which was difficult or troubling to you, either because it made you 
feel bad or because it took effort to deal with it. It might have 
been something to do with your family, with your job, or with your 
friends. Please answer the following questions with a 'yes' or a 
'no' in regards to this event. 
(To be presented in random order) 
1. Bargained or compromised to get something positive from the 
situation. 
2. Concentrated on something good that could come out of the whole 
thing. 
3. Tried not to burn my bridges behind me, but left things open 
somewhat. 
4. Changed or grew as a person in a good way. 
5. Made a plan of action and followed it. 
6. Accepted the next best thing to what I wanted. 
7. Came out of the experience better than when I went in. 
a. Tried not to act too hastily or follow my own hunch. 
9. Changed something so things would turn out all right. 
10. Just took things one step at a time. 
11. I know what had to be done, so I doubled my efforts and tried 
harder to make things work. 
12. Came up with a couple of different solutions to the problem. 
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13. Accepted my strong feelings, but didn't let them interfere with 
other things too much. 
14. Changed something about myself so I could deal with the 
situation better. 
15. Stood my ground and fought for what I wanted. 
16. Talked to someone to find out about the situation. 
17. Accepted sympathy and understanding from someone. 
18. Got professional help and did what they recommended. 
19. Talked to someone who could do something about the problem. 
20. Asked someone I respected for advice and followed it. 
21. Talked to someone about how I was feeling. 
22. Blamed yourself. 
23. Criticized or lectured yourself. 
24. Realized you brought the problem on yourself. 
25. Hoped a miracle would happen. 
26. Wished I was a stronger person - more optimistic and forceful. 
27. Wished that I could change what had happened. 
28. Wished I could change the war that I felt. 
29. Daydreamed or imagined a better time or place than the one I 
was in. 
30. Had fantasies or wishes about how things might turn out. 
31. Thought about fantastic or unreal things (like perfect revenge 
or finding a million dollars) that made me feel better. 
32. Wished the situation would go away or somehow be finished. 
33. Went on as if nothing had happened. 
34. Felt bad that I couldn't avoid the problem. 
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35. Kept my feelings to myself. 
36. Slept more than usual. 
37. Got mad at the people or things that caused the problem. 
38. Tried to forget the whole thing. 
39. Tried to make myself feel better by eating, drinking, smoking, 
or taking medication. 
40. Avoided being with people in general. 
41. Kept others from knowing how bad things were. 
42. Refused to believe that it had happened. 
68 
APPENDIX D 
CHILDREN'S COPING STRATEGIES SCALE 
ccss 
I am interested in how you usually respond to stressful episodes. Could you please tell below 
how you usually respond to upsetting situations? Please think about how you reacted to the 
major life events and the everyday life events that you listed above. Remember: there are 
no right or wrong answers, please tell me honestly what you really do. 
1 2 3 4 5 
never rarely sometimes often always 
1. I cry. 
2. I do something that I enjoy. 
,, 3. . fi I get mto ghts or argue with people. 
4. I smoke cigarettes. 
5. I talk to others about how I'm feeling. 
6. I try to change something about the situation to make it better. 
7. I avoid the problem. 
8. I change myself to make things better. 
9. I release my feelings. 
_ 10. I exercise or play a sport. 
11. I take out my frustration on someone or something else. 
12. I think about hurting myself. 
13. I succeed at telling others how I feel. 
_ 14. I try to convince somebody to act differently. 
_ 15. I keep my feelings and thoughts to myself. 
_ 16. I change my actions to be a better person. 
17. I just let my feelings out. 
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·--~· -- - __ · ... ;; , ..... - ·---.. - ._. --·--·· ---·•---.-- . - .: _ _ ._-___ ._·._- __ :_ ·-'-·· .. 
1 2 3 4 
never rarely sometimes often 
_ 18. I go somewhere in order to relax. 
_ 19. I throw things or break things. 
20. I take drugs or drink alcohol. 
- ····---·,;,,. ~---- ·- ·---- · .. ~: ·. - --
5 
always 
21. I find a close friend or family member to talk to about my problem. 
_ 22. I act to correct the problem in somebody or something else. 
,, 
_ 23. I act as though nothing has happened. 
24. I change something about myself to solve the problem. 
25. I yell and scream. 
_ 26. I take a nap or go to sleep. 
27. I hurt somebody who didn't have anything to do with the problem. 
28. I do something dangerous or risky. 
_ 29. I show people I'm close to how I'm feeling. 
_ 30. I solve the problem by getting someone else to change. 
31. I go off by myself. 
32. I try to act differently myself in order to solve the problem. 












5. substance use: 
items 
5, 9, 13, (-15), 17, 21, 29 
3, 11, 12, 19, 25, 27, 28, 31 
6, 8, 14, 16, 22, 24, 30, 32 
2, 10 
4, 20 




Items administered by computer program 
How desirable is it for you to complete college in 4 years? 
What is the likelihood that you will complete college in 4 years? 
How desirable is it for you to have a successful marriage? 
What is the likelihood that you will have a successful marriage? 
How desirable is it for you to receive an unexpected check in the 
mail in the next month? 
What is the likelihood that you will receive an unexpected check in 
the mail in the next month? 
How desirable is it for you to be positive and optimistic in the 
next week? 
What is the likelihood that you will be positive and optimistic in 
the next week? 
How desirable is it for you to feel thoroughly rested after a night 
of sleep? 
What is the likelihood that you will feel thoroughly rested after 
a night of sleep? 
How desirable is it for you that your first job after college be 
your first choice? 




How desirable is it for you to have a healthy young adulthood? 
What is the likelihood that you will have a healthy young 
adulthood? 
How desirable is it for you to have leisure time after graduating 
from college? What is the likelihood that you will have leisure 
time after you graduate from college? 
How desirable is it for you to have the respect and approval of 
your peers? 
What is the likelihood that you will have the respect and approval 
of your peers? 
How desirable is it for you to receive an "A" in the psychology 
course you are currently taking? 
What is the likelihood that you will receive an "A" in the 
psychology course you are currently taking? 
How desirable is it for you to have a good relationship with your 
parents or guardians? 
What is the likelihood that you will have a good relationship with 
your parents or guardians? 
How desirable is it for you to be able to purchase a new car soon? 
What is the likelihood you will be able to purchase a new car soon? 
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How desirable is it for you to have friends give you a surprise 
birthday party for your next birthday? 
What is the likelihood that friends will give you a surprise 
birthday party for your next birthday? 
How desirable is it for you to travel to Europe in the next four 
years? 
What is the likelihood that you will travel to Europe in the next 
four years? 
How desirable is it for you to have someone give you a compliment 
today? 
What is the likelihood that someone will give you a compliment 
today? 
How desirable is it for you to have your parents stay healthy as 
they age? 
What is the likelihood that your parents will stay healthy as they 
age? 
How desirable is it for you to receiv~ a letter from a friend you 
haven't been in touch with for over a year? 
What is the likelihood that you will receive a letter from a friend 
that you haven't been in touch with for over a year? 
How desirable is it for you to graduate in the top third of your 
college class? 
What is the likelihood that you will graduate in the top third of 
your college class? 
How desirable is it for you to get a job with a starting salary of 
$27,000 or greater? 
What is the likelihood that you will get a job with a starting 
salary of $27,000 or greater? 
How desirable is it for you to have a good laugh today? 
What is the likelihood that you will have a good laugh today? 
How desirable is it for you to be stopped for a speeding ticket in 
the next year? 
What is the likelihood that you will be stopped for a speeding 
ticket in the next year? 
How desirable is it for you to have problems falling asleep at 
night? 
What is the likelihood that you will have problems falling asleep 
at night? 
How desirable is it for you to be stung by a bee next summer? 
What is the likelihood that you will be stung by a bee next summer? 
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How desirable is it for you to be forced to switch apartments in 
the middle of the semester? 
What is the likelihood that you will be forced to switch apartments 
in the middle of the semester? 
How desirable is it for you to have problems with your first boss 
after graduating from college? 
What is the likelihood that you will have problems with your first 
boss after graduating from college? 
How desirable is it for you if a friend gets sick in the next 
month? 
What is the likelihood that a close friend will get sick in the 
next month? 
How desirable is it for you to break a bone in the next year? 
What is the likelihood that you will break a bone in the next year? 
How desirable is it for you to have less spending money in the next 
month? 
What is the likelihood that you will have less spending money in 
the next month? 
How desirable is it for you to be divorced in your lifetime? 
What is the likelihood that you will be divorced in your lifetime? 
How desirable is it for you to have an argument with friend in.the 
next month? 
What is the likelihood that you will have an argument with a friend 
in the next month? 
How desirable is it for you that the Cash Station runs out of money 
when you are in a hurry? 
What is the likelihood that the Cash Station will be out of money 
when you are in a hurry? 
How desirable is it for you to be depressed for a week? 
What is the likelihood that you will be depressed for a week in the 
next year? 
How desirable is it for you to bounce a check? 
What is the likelihood that you will bounce a check in the next 
year? 
How desirable is it for you to ruin your favorite pair of pants in 
the laundry? 
What is the likelihood that you will ruin your favorite pair of 
pants in the laundry in the next year? 
How desirable is it for you to have to drop out of college? 
What is the likelihood that you will have to drop out of college? 
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How desirable is it for you to not find a job in the year after 
starting your job search? 
What is the likelihood that you will not find a job for a year 
after starting your job search? 
How desirable is it for you to receive an obscene phone call? 
What is the likelihood that you will receive and obscene phone call 
in the next month? 
How desirable is it for you to realize that the car you bought is 
a lemon? 
What is the likelihood that you will realize that the car you 
bought is a lemon? 
How desirable is it for you to look back someday at college and 
feel that you should have gotten a different major? 
What is the likelihood that you will look back at college and feel 
that you should have had a different major? 
How desirable is it for you to be sued? 
What is the likelihood that you will be sued in your lifetime? 
What is the desirability of you rolling a 6,7,9, or 10 if you win 
$1 for rolling one of these numbers? 
What is the likelihood of rolling a 6,7,9 or 10 if you win $1 for 
rolling one of these numbers? 
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What is the desirability of you rolling a 4,5,6, or 7 if you win $1 
for rolling one of these nwnbers? 
What is the likelihood of you rolling a 4,5,6, or 7 if you win $1 
for rolling one of these nwnbers? 
What is the desirability of you rolling a 3,6,7, or 8 if you win $5 
for rolling one of these numbers? 
What is the likelihood of you rolling a 3,6,7, or 8 if you win $5 
for rolling one of these numbers? 
What is the desirability of you rolling a 5,6,7, or 10 if you win 
$5 for rolling one of these numbers? 
What is the likelihood of you rolling a 5,6,7, or 10 if you win $5 
for rolling one of these numbers? 
What is the desirability of you rolling a 7,8,9, or 10 if you lose 
$1 for rolling one of these numbers? 
What is the likelihood of you rolling a 7,8,9 or 10 if you lose $1 
for rolling one of these nwnbers? 
What is the desirability of you rolling a 4,7,8, or 9 if you lose 
$1 for rolling one of these numbers? 
What is the likelihood of you rolling a 4,7,8, or 9 if you lose $1 
for rolling one of these numbers? 
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What is the desirability of you rolling a 6,7,8, or 11 if you lose 
$5 for rolling one of these numbers? 
What is the likelihood of you rolling a 6,7,8, or 11 if you lose $5 
for rolling one of these numbers? 
What is the desirability of you rolling a 5,7,8, or 10 if you lose 
$5 for rolling one of these numbers? 
What is the likelihood of you rolling a 5,7,8, or 10 if you lose $5 
for rolling one of these numbers? 
What is the desirability of you rolling a 2,4,6,8 or 9 if you win 
$1 for rolling one of these numbers? 
What is the likelihood of you rolling a 2,4,6,8, or 9 if you win $1 
for rolling one of these numbers? 
What is the desirability of you rolling a 3,5,7,8, or 12 if you win 
$1 for rolling one of these numbers? 
What is the likelihood of you rolling a 3,5,7,8, or 12 if you win 
$1 for rolling one of these numbers? 
What is the desirability of you rolling a 2,5,6,8, or 10 if you win 
$5 for rolling one of these numbers? 
What is the likelihood of you rolling a 2,5,6,8, or 10 if you win 
$5 for rolling one of these numbers? 
What is the desirability of you rolling a 5,6,7,11, or 12 if ycu 
win$ 5 for rolling one of these numbers? 
What is the likelihood of you rolling a 5,6,7,11, or 12 if you win 
$5 for rolling one of these numbers? 
What is the desirability of you rolling a 2,3,7,8, or 9 if you lose 
$1 for rolling one of these numbers? 
What is the likelihood of you rolling a 2,3,7,8, or 9 if you lose 
$1 for rolling one of these numbers? 
What is the desirability of you rolling a 5,6,8,10, or 12 if you 
lose $1 for rolling one of these numbers? 
What is the likelihood of you rolling a 5,6,8,10, or 12 if you lose 
$1 for rolling one of these numbers? 
What is the desirability of you rolling a 2,6,7,9, or 11 if you 
lose $5 for rolling one of these numbers? 
What is the likelihood of you rolling a 2,6,7,9, or 11 if you lose 
$5 for rolling one of these numbers? 
What is the desirability of you rolling a 2,3,5,7, or 8 if you lose 
$5 for rolling one of these numbers? 
What is the likelihood of you rolling a 2,3,5,7 or 8 if you lose 
$5 for rolling one of these numbers? 
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What is the desirability of you rolling a 2,3,7,9,10, or 11 if you 
win $1 for rolling one of these numbers? 
What is the likelihood of you rolling a 2,3,7,9,10, or 11 if you 
win $1 for rolling one of these numbers? 
What is the desirability of you rolling a 4,5,8,l0,ll, or 12 if you 
win $1 for rolling one of these numbers? 
What is the likelihood of you rolling a 4,5,8,10,11, or 12 if you 
win $1 for rolling one of these numbers? 
What is the desirability of you rolling a 2,5,6,9,10, or 12 if you 
win $5 for rolling one of these numbers? 
What is the likelihood of you rolling a 2,5,6,9,10, or 12 if you 
win $5 for rolling one of these numbers? 
What is the desirability of you rolling a 3,4,5,9,10, or 11 if you 
win $5 for rolling one of these numbers? 
What is the likelihood of you rolling a 3,4,5,9,10, or 11 if you 
win $5 for rolling one of these numbers? 
What is the desirability of you rolling a 2,4,6,8,10, or 12 if you 
lose $1 for rolling one of these numbers? 
What is the likelihood of you rolling a 2,4,6,8,10, or 12 if you 
lose $1 for rolling one of these numbers? 
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What is the desirability of you rolling a 3,4,7,9,11, or 12 if you 
lose $1 for rolling one of these numbers? 
What is the likelihood of you rolling a 3,4,7,9,11, or 12 if you 
lose $1 for rolling one of these numbers? 
What is the desirability of you rolling a 2,3,5,8,9, or 11 if you 
lose $5 for rolling one of these numbers? 
What is the likelihood of you rolling a 2,3,5,8,9, or 11 if you 
lose $5 for rolling one of these numbers? 
What is the desirability of you rolling a 4,8,9,10,11, or 12 if you 
lose $5 for rolling one of these numbers? 
What is the likelihood of you rolling a 4,8,9,10,11, or 12 if you 
lose $5 for rolling one of these numbers? 
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APPENDIX F 
JUDGMENT OF CONTROL QUESTIONNAIRE 
When answering the following questions, think back to the 
statements you answered on the computer. 




2. To what extent did the score increase when your DESIRABILITY 
ratings were HIGH? 
o----10----20----3o----4o----so----6o----7o----so----90----100 
NEVER AT11'/AYS 
3. To what extent did the score increase when your DESIRABILITY 
ratings were LOW? 
o----10----20----3o----4o----so----6o----7o----so----90----100 
NEVER AT11'/AYS 
4. To what extent did the score increase when you rated the 





5. To what extent did the score increase when you rated the 
LIKELIHOOD of an event LOW? 
o----10----20----30----40----so----60----70----ao----90----100 
NEVER AI.WAYS 
6. To what extent did the score increase when you rated the 
LIKELIHOOD of a DESIRABLE event as HIGH? 
o----10----20----3o----4o----so----6o----7o----ao----90----100 
NEVER ALWAYS 
7. To what extent did the score increase when you rated the 
LIKELIHOOD of a DESIRABLE event as LOW? 
o----10----20----3o----4o----so----6o----7o----ao----90----100 
NEVER .AIWAYS 
8. To what extent did the score increase when you rated the 
LIKELIHOOD of an UNDESIRABLE event as HIGH? 
o----10----20----30----4o----so----6o----7o----ao----90----100 
NEVER ALWAYS 
9. To what extent did the score increase when you rated the 
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